The Adventurous Tale of Online Voting in Switzerland

Christian Folini / @ChrFolini


OWASP BE - 2021-03-18

Voting in Switzerland



Photo: Gian Ehrensberger

Process Around Swiss Mail-in Ballots



Killer / Stiller : The Swiss Postal Voting Process and its System and Security Analysis

Typical Swiss Election Ballot



Wahl von 7 Mitgliedern des Grossen Rats vom 18. Oktober 2020

-	Bezirk
	Muri

p

glp - Grünliberale Partei 06 Budmiger Hans-Peter (Hampi), 1976, Unternehmer, Gemeindepräsident, Muri 06.01 06.02 Langenbacher Knüsel Silvia, 1966, Unternehmerin, Abtwil Budniger Hans-Peter 26.01 Peyer Samuel, 1985, BSc in Wirtschaftsinformatik, Unternehmer, Muri 06.03 06.04 Masoch Loredana, 1996, BLaw, Masterstudentin Rechtswissenschaften, Waltenschwil Stock Comel 26.05 Stöckli Cornel, 1975, Dr. med., Rheumat. & Innere Med., Integrationskom., Muri 06.05 06.06 Chande Sabrina, 1989, Projektleiterin Elektroplanung, Mitalied GL, Buttwil Bucher Rall, CVP 04.01 Weber Thomas, 1974, Content Manager, Journalist, Buttwil 06.07 Vom Wahlbüro Zusatzstimmen: Total: Kandidatenstimmen: auszufüllen

Typical Swiss Election Ballot



auszufüllen

Wahl von 7 Mitgliedern des Grossen Rats vom 18. Oktober 2020

-	Bezirk
	Muri

glp - Grünliberale Partei 06 Budmiger Hans-Peter (Hampi), 1976, Unternehmer, Gemeindepräsident, Muri 06.01 06.02 Langenbacher Knüsel Silvia, 1966, Unternehmerin, Abtwil Budnice Hans-Pota 26.01 Peyer Samuel, 1985, BSc in Wirtschaftsinformatik, Unternehmer, Muri 06.03 06.04 Masoch Loredana, 1996, BLaw, Masterstudentin Rechtswissenschaften, Waltenschwil Stock Comel 26.05 Stöckli Cornel, 1975, Dr. med., Rheumat. & Innere Med., Integrationskom., Muri 06.05 06.06 Chande Sabrina, 1989. Projektleiterin Elektroplanung, Mitalied GL, Buttwil Bucher Rall, CVP 04.01 Weber Thomas, 1974, Content Manager, Journalist, Buttwil 06.07 Vom Wahlbüro Zusatzstimmen: Total:

Kandidatenstimmen:

Bonus points for spotting the content manager from Butt-ville.



"We simply can't build an Internet voting system that is secure against hacking because of the requirement for a secret ballot."

Bruce Schneier, Online Voting Won't Save Democracy, The Atlantic, May 2017

The Swiss Perspective

- Citizens living abroad

- Citizens living abroad
- Visually impaired and quadriplegic voters

- Citizens living abroad
- Visually impaired and quadriplegic voters
- Formally invalid ballots

- Citizens living abroad
- Visually impaired and quadriplegic voters
- Formally invalid ballots
- Security issues of physical voting

The Cantons of Switzerland



Graphic: Wikipedia

Timeline

1st Swiss internet voting pro-ject is launched with three pilot cantons.

1st project

2000

Swiss expats are allowed to vote via Scytl internet voting system in canton Neuchâtel.

Entering Scytl

2008



Federal administration and cantons establish a joint steering committee.

Steering Board

2011



1st Geneva trial

2004

Canton Geneva runs the first Swiss internet voting trial.



Consortium

2009

Eight Swiss cantons form a consortium and commission Unisys with the creation of an internet voting system.



Timeline

Federal administration and cantons establish a joint steering committee.

Steering Board

Spanish Scytl and Swiss Post form joint venture and go into production.

Scytl/Swiss Post join



2011

Consortium dies

2015

t

The eight consortium cantons throw towel after federal administration barrs system from use in national elections.

2016

Mainstreaming attempt

2017

The federal chancellor calls for 2/3 of the cantons to offer internet voting for national elections in 2019.

Geneva Quits



Chancellerie Genève @GE_chancellerie · 19. Juni 2019 ···· Elections fédérales 2019: le canal de vote électronique ne sera pas proposé



Point presse du Conseil d'Etat du 19 juin 2019

Elections fédérales 2019: le canal de vote électronique ne sera pas proposé. Adoption du plan d'actions développement durable 2019-2023... & ge.ch

0 11

C

 \bigtriangledown

₾

Source: Twitter: @GE_chancellerie (1141332323025195009)

2018: Development stopped 2019: System terminated

Timeline

Spanish Scytl and Swiss Post form joint venture and go into production.

Scytl/Swiss Post join

Political quarrels lead to Geneva stopping all further development. A year later, the system is terminated.

Geneva quits

2018



2016

Mainstreaming attempt

2017

The federal chancellor calls for 2/3 of the cantons to offer internet voting for national elections in 2019.




Source Code Publication Bug Bounty

2019

Scytl / Swiss Post publish the source code of their system and run a 4 week bug bounty

Swiss Post Bug Bounty: We got this!

Abschlussbericht Öffentlicher Intrusionstest



DIE POST [BEST PRACTICES] Incorrect 'HTTP-Strict-Transport-Security' header on 'pit-admin.evotingtest.ch'

> REDMINE ID: #188 SUBMISSION: Feb. 25th 2019, 23:19 (GMT+1) RESEARCHER(S): Jacob.Rees-Earcher COMPENSATION: CHF 200.-

When connecting to 'pit-admin.evoting-test.ch' on port 443, the server sends an HTTP-Strict-Transport-Security header even for plaintext HTTP connections, which is a violation of RFC 6797. The additional header also does not contain the 'includeSubdomain' directive, which would be a security best-practice.

[BEST PRACTICES] Use of 'unsafe-eval' and 'unsafe-inline' in Content Security Policy

[BEST PRACTICES] Multiple occurrences of 'X-XSS-Protection' HTTP header

REDMINE ID: #234 SUBMISSION: Feb. 28th 2019, 14:57 (GMT+1) RESEARCHER(S): pitbull COMPENSATION: CHF 100.-

Some error messages sent as responses by the web server (specifically, the '403 Forbidden' status code) include two identical occurrences of the 'X-XSS-Protection' security header. This behavior is non-standard, and could lead to undefined behavior in some browsers.

Swiss Post / Scytl Source Code: Not so good

Vanessa Teague @VTeagueAus - 12. März 2019 The trapdoor-commitment issue in the Swiss e-voting system was also independently discovered by Thomas Haines of NTNU and by Rolf Haenni of Bern University of Apolied Sciences. @Sarah Jamiel ewis

The Register®

Security

Swiss electronic voting system like... wait for it, wait for it... Swiss cheese: Hole found amid public source code

O 16

Vulnerabilities

Diesen Thread anzeigen

The Daily Swig

Cybersecurity news and views

audit

Court Installation

Hey, at least it was dis – which is the whole p By Thomas Claburn in San Francis

Cyber-attacks

Sarah Jamie Lewis ("Sarah Jamie Lewis - 12. März 2019 It is 9am Swiss Time, ("WTeague Aus, Olivier Pereira & I are releasing details of a cryptographic trapdoor that we found in the Swiss Post #evoting system that would allows admins to falsely "prove" mixes that alter votes & undetectably compromise elections: people.eng.unimelb.edu.au/yteague/Swiss...

0 1.194

Cybercrime

he

仚

17 862

Bug Bounties

MOTHERBOARD

Researchers Find Critical Backdoor in Swiss Online Voting System

und a severe issue in the new Swiss internet ley say would let someone alter votes y it should put a halt to Switzerland's plan to roll d elections this year.

🛿 Share 🎔 Tweet 🌲 Snap

Vanessa Teague @VTeagueAus · 11. Apr. 2019

@SarahJamieLewis, Olivier Pereira & I found serious cryptographic errors in Scylt's Swiss/NSW evoting system. Will Scylt's Aus Senate counting code remain serce and will it enter votes into the count without a public audit of our paper ballots?


tenders.gov.au/?event=public....

😯 Vanessa Teague @VTeagueAus · 11. Apr. 2019

I agree with @damonism on the safety of paper ballots in Aus elections, but the electronic Senate count opens the possibility for undetected error or fraud unless there's a rigorous public audit of the paper records against the digitized preferences. arxiv.org/abs/1610.00127 twitter.com/GeoffreyHPowel...

1,2 ♡3 1

to be continued ...



James Walker 05 April 2019 at 08:35 UTC

Data Breaches

Election Security Government Encryption

Timeline

Spanish Scytl and Swiss Post form joint venture and go into production.

Scytl/Swiss Post join

Political quarrels lead to Geneva stopping all further development. A year later, the system is terminated.

Geneva quits

2018

The steering board establishes a dialog with 25 scientists to assess viability of internet voting and support with writing new regulation.

Rebooting

2020

2016

Mainstreaming attempt

2017

The federal chancellor calls on 2/3 of the cantons to offer internet voting for national elections in 2019.



Source Code Publication

2019

行

Scytl / Swiss Post publish the source code of their system. Researchers identify three critical vulnerabilities within weeks. The system is put on hold.



Expert Dialogue – Participating Scientists

CRYPTOGRAPHERS AND ONLINE VOTING EXPERTS

David Basin, ETH Zurich Srdjan Capkun, ETH Zurich Eric Dubuis, BFH Bern Bryan Ford, EPF Lausanne Reto Koenig, BFH Bern Philipp Locher, BFH Bern Olivier Pereira, University of Leuven, Belgium Vanessa Teague, Australia Bogdan Warinschi, Bristol, UK Rolf Haenni, BFH Bern

SECURITY INDUSTRY

Stéphane Adamiste, SCRT Sergio Alves Domingues, SCRT Tobias Ellenberger, One Consult

COMPUTER SCIENTISTS

David-Olivier Jaquet-Chiffelle, University of Lausanne Oscar Nierstrasz, University of Bern Adrian Perrig, ETH Zurich Carsten Schürmann, Denmark Matthias Stürmer, University of Bern Ulrich Ultes-Nitsche, University of Fribourg

POLITICAL SCIENTISTS Florian Egloff, ETH Zurich Fabrizio Gilardi, University of Zurich Uwe Serdült, Center for Democracy, Aarau

MODERATOR Christian Folini, netnea.com

Source: https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/de/home/politische-rechte/e-voting.html

Expert Dialogue – Participating Scientists

CRYPTOGRAPHERS AND ONLINE VOTING EXPERTS David Basin, ETH Zurich Srdjan Capkun, ETH Zurich Eric Dubuis, BFH Bern Bryan Ford, EPF Lausanne Reto Koenig, BFH Bern Philipp Locher, BFH Bern Olivier Pereira, University of Leuven, Belgium Vanessa Teague, Australia Bogdan Warinschi, Bristol, UK Rolf Haenni, BFH Bern

SECURITY INDUSTRY

Stéphane Adamiste, SCRT Sergio Alves Domingues, SCRT Tobias Ellenberger, One Consult

COMPUTER SCIENTISTS

David-Olivier Jaquet-Chiffelle, University of Lausanne Oscar Nierstrasz, University of Bern Adrian Perrig, ETH Zurich

Carsten Schürmann, Denmark Matthias Stürmer, University of Bern Ulrich Ultes-Nitsche. University of Friboura

POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

Florian Egloff, ETH Zurich

Fabrizio Gilardi, University of Zurich Uwe Serdült, Center for Democracy, Aarau

MODERATOR Christian Folini, netnea.com

Source: https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/de/home/politische-rechte/e-voting.html

Expert Dialogue – Participating Scientists

CRYPTOGRAPHERS AND ONLINE VOTING EXPERTS

David Basin, ETH Zurich Srdjan Capkun, ETH Zurich Eric Dubuis, BFH Bern Bryan Ford, EPF Lausanne Reto Koenig, BFH Bern Philipp Locher, BFH Bern Olivier Pereira, University of Leuven, Belgium Vanessa Teague, Australia Bogdan Warinschi, Bristol, UK

SECURITY INDUSTRY

Rolf Haenni, BFH Bern

Stéphane Adamiste, SCRT Sergio Alves Domingues, SCRT Tobias Ellenberger, One Consult

COMPUTER SCIENTISTS

David-Olivier Jaquet-Chiffelle, University of Lausanne Oscar Nierstrasz, University of Bern Adrian Perrig, ETH Zurich Carsten Schürmann, Denmark Matthias Stürmer, University of Bern Ulrich Ultes-Nitsche, University of Fribourg

POLITICAL SCIENTISTS Florian Egloff, ETH Zurich Fabrizio Gilardi, University of Zurich Uwe Serdült, Center for Democracy, Aarau

MODERATOR Christian Folini, netnea.com

Source: https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/de/home/politische-rechte/e-voting.html

Timeline

The dialogue starts with a survey over 62 questions sent to 25 scientists

Survey



The workshops are replaced with a 12 weeks online dialogue on a dedicated gitlab platform.

Online dialogue

2020.4



The steering board publishes the 70 pages report with the recommendations of the scientists.

Scientific report

2020.11

2020.2

2020.3

Covid-19 hits

When the on-site workshops were slowly taking shape, Switzerland entered a lockdown and the on-site gatherings had to be called off.



Additional research

2020.7

Several separate research articles are commissioned with individual scientists to bring up more information on individual questions.



Scientific report

Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft Confédération suisse Confederazione Svizzera Confederazione svizzera Bundeskanzlei BK Sekton Politische Rechte

Summary of the expert dialog

Redesign of Internet Voting Trials in Switzerland 2020

19th November 2020

Conte	onts	
1. Pu	rpose	
2. Ba		
3. Int	roductory Remarks4	
4. Bi	ock 1 - Effectiveness of Cryptography4	
4.1	Overview	
4.2	Summaries of the answers to the related questions of the questionnaire	
4.3	Introduction to Block 1 on the platform6	
4.4	Questions and summaries of the discussions on the platform	
5. Bi	ock 2 - Diversity to support security and trust-building9	
5.1	Overview	
5.2	Summaries of the answers to the related questions of the questionnaire	
5.3	Introduction to Block 2 on the platform	
5.4	Questions and summaries of the discussions on the platform	
6. Bk	ock 3 - Printing-Office (Diversity to support security and trust-building - Part 2)	
6.1	Overview	
6.2	Summaries of the answers to the related questions of the questionnaire	
6.3	Introduction to Block 3 on the platform	
6.4	Questions and summaries of the discussions on the platform	
7. Bi	ock 4 – Public Bulletin Board	
7.1	Overview	
7.2	Summaries of the answers to the related questions of the questionnaire	
7.3	Introduction to Block 4 on the platform	
7.4	Questions and summaries of the discussions on the platform	
8. Bi	ock 5 – Examinations Mandated by Government	
8.1	Overview31	
8.2	Summaries of the answers to the related questions of the questionnaire	
8.3	Introduction to Block 5 on the platform33	
8.4	Questions and summaries of the discussions on the platform	
9. Bi	ock 6 – Development and Publication	
9.1	Overview 37	
9.2	Summaries of the answers to the related questions of the questionnaire	
9.3	Introduction to Block 6 on the platform	
9.4	Questions and summaries of the discussions on the platform	
10. Block 7 – Public Intrusion Test and Bug Bounty		
10. 1	block / - Public Indusion Test and bug bounty	

https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/en/home/politische-rechte/e-voting.html

- Strict hierarchy of specifications

- Strict hierarchy of specifications
- Diversity in hard- and software

- Strict hierarchy of specifications
- Diversity in hard- and software
- Maximum level of transparency, namely in development

- Strict hierarchy of specifications
- Diversity in hard- and software
- Maximum level of transparency, namely in development
- Voting security beyond internet voting

Summary

- Switzerland is a useful test bed for online voting
- Iterative process with strict supervision on federal level
- Expert dialogue with recommendations in 2020

Download English version of report from https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/en/home/politische-rechte/e-voting.html



Christian Folini

christian.folini@netnea.com

@ChrFolini

Download English version of report from https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/en/home/politische-rechte/e-voting.html